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Is Election a Disadvantage? 
Nigerian Local Councils and 
Security Provision 
Ayobami Ojebode, Ike Ernest Onyishi and  
Fatai A. Aremu*
Abstract Deepening democracy through local elections is a major aim 
of decentralisation. But do elections always work to strengthen the 
relationship between local politicians and citizens, or can they set elected 
officials up for failure? This article examines security provisioning by local 
governments in Nigeria, understanding that some local governments are 
elected, while others are appointed by state governors. Our hypothesis 
was that elected local councils should be better rated than those that 
are appointed. By looking at local government areas that differ mainly 
in terms of whether their council is elected or appointed, we found 
that local elections are not enough singly to build strong connections 
between democratically elected local politicians and citizens. Democratic 
decentralisation in the context of limited financial resources, and limited 
autonomy vis-à-vis state governors and political bosses, can set elected 
governments up for failure to the extent that they are viewed as worse 
performers than their appointed counterparts.
Keywords: democratic decentralisation, Nigeria, local government 
elections, security provision, citizen perception.
1 Introduction
Nigeria operates a three-tier federal system made up of  the federal 
government, 36 state governments and 774 local governments. Whereas 
assumption of  the office of  the president or state governor is usually by 
election, assumption of  the office of  the local government chairperson 
can be by election or appointment. Elected local government chairpersons 
emerge from multiparty elections organised by state governments, while 
appointed local government chairpersons are handpicked solely by state 
governors from their party loyalists. Among the 774 local government 
chairpersons in Nigeria, only 202 (26 per cent) are elected while 572 
(74 per cent) are appointed. In other words, although local councils are the 
closest tier of  government to the people, in three-quarters of  these, citizens 
have had no input in deciding who leads them at this level.1
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Democracy theorists and pundits (Marcus, Mease and Ottemoeller 
2001; Post 2005; Maruatona 2006; Lindberg 2006; Hiley 2006) seem 
to strongly suggest that where citizens do not have input into deciding 
their leaders, there might be some form of  disconnect leading to a 
poor perception of  the government in question, disengagement and, 
ultimately, cynicism. This is, however, not a completely settled argument. 
For instance, citizens’ favourable perceptions of  some non‑democratic 
or authoritarian governments such as China (Saich 2016) suggest that 
citizens’ non-involvement in the (s)election of  political leaders may not 
always automatically lead to disaffection. The jury is thus still out on the 
link between elections and citizen perception of  government.
The structure of  local government in Nigeria provides a useful context 
for further investigating this link. With elected and selected councils 
sharing borders in many places, it was possible to set up a comparative 
study that examined if  and how a local council’s democratic status 
influenced citizens’ perception of  a political administration. By 
democratic status we refer to whether a local council is elected or 
appointed. Existing studies suggest that elected councils should be 
more responsive to citizens and perform duties in a way that pleases the 
electorate, in order to get re-elected or get elected to higher positions 
(Inyang and Abraham 2013; Enejo and Isa 2014). This suggests that 
appointed councils should be more responsive to the state governors that 
appoint them, and should seek to please them so as to retain their seat 
or get selected for higher positions. Accordingly, we hypothesised that 
an elected local government council would be perceived more positively 
by the electorate than a selected one because, being closer to the people 
and being a product of  their choice, an elected council should not only 
initiate programmes that resonate with the aspirations of  the electorate 
but also do so in ways that involve the contributions of  the citizens.
We wove our investigation around the provision of  security by local 
councils because not only is security a major issue in Nigeria, but it is 
also an issue that very often affects how Nigerian citizens perceive the 
effectiveness of  government. For instance, observers pointed out that 
security was a major reason that the government of  President Goodluck 
Jonathan lost re‑election in 2015 (Owen and Usman 2015; Zane 2015). 
Insurgency, herdsmen-related violence, pipeline destruction and oil 
theft, kidnapping and ransom‑taking are some of  the problems that 
make security a topical public agenda in Nigeria.
Although providing security for citizens is not one of  the functions 
of  the local government specified by the Nigerian Constitution, most 
local governments provide security in one form or another. In fact, the 
chairperson of  the local government council is regarded as the chief  
security officer of  the local government area (LGA). This is despite 
the fact that local governments are not permitted to have their police 
or armed forces or to recruit, train or arm any security personnel. In 
providing security for its citizens, the local government necessarily works 
with a variety of  actors. These include agencies of  state such as the 
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police, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and 
the State Security Service (SSS). They also include non-state actors, 
such as traditional rulers and other community leaders, local ‘vigilante’ 
groups (groups of  volunteers that are found nationwide in Nigeria), 
and market‑women leaders. Thus, providing security for citizens can 
become a local government’s way of  providing employment, interacting 
with and getting closer to the citizens, and possibly building a stronger 
reputation for delivery.
In the context of  the decentralisation of  security provision to the lowest 
tier of  government, it is important to pay attention to citizens’ evaluation 
of  their local government for a number of  reasons. First, decentralisation, 
whether it takes the form of  devolution or de‑concentration, is expected 
to broaden local participation in decision‑making (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006). As a result, local communities should feel a sense of  
ownership, which can only be examined from the perspectives of  citizens. 
Second, most crimes are experienced locally within the community, and 
are committed against individuals. Therefore, it is individual citizens that 
are best positioned to evaluate crime prevention efforts. Third, there is 
often a disparity between actual crime rate and citizens’ perception of  
their safety and security (Ojebode et al. 2016). So long as the purpose 
of  a study is to understand how safe citizens feel, working with crime 
rate figures rather than citizens’ perception can be misleading. Our 
study is thus based on citizens’ perception of  the performance of  local 
governments in providing security, rather than on measures of  actual 
security provision at the local level.
We paired two local government areas: Asa Local Government 
and Surulere Local Government. These two local governments are 
separated from one another by an arbitrarily2 drawn border that 
cuts across them to create two different official political entities, but 
both areas are very similar in many ways. They face similar security 
situations, are identical economically, are both largely rural and 
agrarian, and their populations are similar in linguistic, cultural and 
religious terms. However, there is a key difference. While Asa has an 
elected local council, Surulere’s council was appointed by the state 
governor. If  our hypothesis holds true, citizens of  Asa should express a 
more positive perception of  their local council than citizens of  Surulere.
Contrary to our hypothesis, however, our empirical data reveals that 
in spite of  their shared common experiences of  insecurity types and 
levels, citizens of  Asa, the elected council, remained deeply disaffected 
with their local government, while citizens of  Surulere, the appointed 
council, were satisfied with their council’s performance. This is despite 
the fact that Asa’s local government actually initiated a new project 
to deal with security provision, while Surulere did not. Disaffection 
or satisfaction was not a product of  experience of  crime, or actual 
performance by local governments. Rather, it was a product of  the 
approach to crime prevention adopted by the council, which in itself  is 
traceable to the democratic status of  the council. Our analysis revealed 
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that in its bid to respond to and impress the electorate, the elected 
council initiated new security programmes, recruited citizens and placed 
them on a regular salary but was unable to sustain these programmes. 
This situation led to disaffection on the part of  the citizens. The 
appointed local government, on the other hand, was committed to 
pleasing the state government only; it did not set up any new security 
programmes nor did it recruit any citizens. Its support for existing 
informal and community‑based security arrangements was modest and 
irregular, but consistent. This was appreciated by citizens who, as a 
result, expressed a positive perception of  the council. The rest of  our 
article draws out this argument in detail.
2 What are African elections worth?
A number of  issues with the quality of  national and local elections in 
Africa have been pointed out by different scholars and commentators. 
Low voter turnout, violence during elections, and arrant rigging have 
been the recurring features of  elections almost across the continent 
(Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006; Ikpe 2009). Yet, elections are now a 
regular feature of  African politics, and are organised by most types 
of  regimes, even if  many of  their problems remain (Brown 2001). 
Ake (1996: 137) has pointed out that despite several rounds of  
elections, ‘authoritarian state structures remain, accountability to the 
government is weak, and the rule of  law is sometimes nominal. More 
often than not, people are voting without choosing’. More recently, 
Marcus et al. (2001: 113) describe African elections as the elite’s 
‘mechanism for lending authority to otherwise authoritarian regimes, 
rather than creating competitive processes for the attainment of  power’ 
while Adejumobi (2008: 362) describes them as a fading shadow of  
democracy which endangers the democratic process itself  by leading 
Africa back to the old order of  ‘despotic rulership’.
The poor quality of  elections leads to loss of  accountability and 
legitimacy. Lindberg (2003) studied the electoral practices and tactics 
of  Ghanaian members of  parliament and found a resurgence of  
neo-patrimonial practices as politicians engaged in patron–client 
relationships to reproduce their political power. This threatens both 
vertical and horizontal accountability. Growing apathy and cynicism 
are other consequences of  repeated rounds of  elections that fail the 
standard tests of  transparency and equality in Africa (Ake 1996; 
Maruatona 2006).
Yet, African elections, despite their imperfections, matter. Beyond 
Bratton’s (1998) dictum that there can be elections without democracy 
but there can be no democracy without election, Lindberg’s (2006: 143) 
rigorous study of  the significance of  African elections shows that 
‘elections do not have to be free and fair or fully democratic to have 
democratizing effects’. He goes on to demonstrate that even though 
they were grossly imperfect and far below standard, there was a 
strong correlation between frequency of  elections and the growth of  
democratic ideals, as operationalised by Freedom House ratings. Going 
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beyond ordinary correlations, Lindberg (2006) demonstrates the causal 
pathway that elections in Africa take to produce democratic outcomes.
We imagined that the same principle applies to local governments as 
well, where repeated local elections might produce cumulative positive 
democratic outcomes over time, including on accountability and 
responsiveness. Applying Lindberg’s (2006) findings on democratic 
‘lock‑ins’ to the context of  the current study, we can expect there to be 
a marked difference in the performance of  elected local councils and 
that of  appointed councils. If  we can hold other things constant, this 
difference should be attributable to the conduct of  elections and the 
democratic status of  local councils. This now is our methodological 
challenge. Importantly, we expect this marked difference to be reflected 
in the way citizens perceive and evaluate the performances of  their local 
government authorities, such that citizens of  local councils where there 
are regular elections will evaluate the local authorities better than those 
in local councils where council leaders are appointed by the governor. 
Our two selected cases serve our purpose well here – Asa Local 
Government has remained an elected local government since Nigeria’s 
return to democracy in 1999, while Surulere has moved back and forth 
between being elected and being appointed, but has had an appointed 
status since 2010.3
3 Decentralisation and local government security services provision
Provision of  security services is a constitutional duty of  the federal 
government, the same government that controls the security and crime 
prevention apparatuses, such as the SSS and the police. However, 
crime and insecurity records show that, especially in Africa, the federal 
government is failing in providing these crucial services in spite of  these 
apparatuses. Thirty-one per cent of  nearly half-a-million homicides 
globally in 2012 were committed in Africa (UNODC 2013), and 
Nigeria ranked among the top 20 nations with the highest crime rates 
in the world (Numbeo 2015). The Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data Project (ACLED 2014) ranked Nigeria the deadliest country in 
Africa, with about 29 per cent of  all organised armed conflict‑related 
fatalities in 2014. That was the year the country recorded 6,383 
deaths largely caused by the insurgency in the North. Property theft, 
kidnapping and pipeline vandalism are among the other rising causes of  
insecurity in Nigeria.
However, Nigeria, like many other governments all over the world, has 
come to the conclusion that state policing alone is incapable of  solving 
or abating insecurity owing to historical, economic, cultural and other 
limitations (Killingray 1986; Marenin 2009). As a result, the country has 
been promoting different forms of  community‑based crime prevention 
(Ojebode et al. 2016). Since these are activities at the community level, 
they undoubtedly call for the involvement of  the local government. 
There are security committees within local government councils that are 
headed by the chairperson and bring together all state security agencies 
with the members of  more informal community‑based crime prevention 
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groups, such as local vigilantes, hunters and watchmen, and community 
leaders. Thus, although providing security services is not one of  the 
duties of  the local government as enshrined in the constitution, the 
Federal Government of  Nigeria has devolved that duty to the local 
government level, designating the local government chairperson as the 
chief  security officer of  the local government area.
Literature on decentralisation is indecisive on whether or not devolved 
service provision is effective. On the one hand, local governments’ 
involvement in the provision of  services is believed to broaden access 
and improve service delivery (Kolehmainen‑Aitken 1999; McLean 
and King 1999; World Bank 2001), enhance accountability (World 
Bank 2000), minimise violence (World Bank 2001) and empower local 
communities (Brinkerhoff and Azfar 2006). On the other hand, local 
government provision of  services could create a platform for clientelism, 
budgetary constraints and bureaucratic bottlenecks (World Bank 2001). 
The tendency also exists for local council leaders to overreach their 
mandates in a bid to garner popular support during elections (where 
councils are democratically elected), creating high expectations among 
the citizens without sufficient budgetary and technical resources to 
deliver (Rawnsley 2001).
This inconclusive state of  the existing literature necessitates context-
specific investigations such as this one. Within the broad construct 
of  decentralisation and in the specific context of  Nigeria, we seek to 
understand citizens’ evaluation of  the performance of  local councils in 
the decentralised provision of  security services, and also why citizens 
hold such views.
4 A typology of local councils’ democratic status
The constitution of  Nigeria mandates local councils to be elected by 
citizens, but at the same time it also allows state governments to select 
members of  a local council if  they believe an election is not feasible. 
Using this constitutional provision, many state governments do not 
organise elections and prefer to nominate local councils. This decision 
is entirely that of  state governors, and the reason most often cited for 
nominating local councils is a lack of  funds for organising elections, 
or a tense atmosphere in the state that can ignite electoral violence. 
A popular perception is that this happens most often when governors 
are unsure if  their party would win the local councils. In other cases, 
some state governments are simply unable to organise local government 
elections owing to resource and logistical constraints.
These different practices allow us to construct a descriptive typology of  
the democratic status of  local councils. When the ruling party selects 
local councils from among party loyalists, we can think of  these Type 1 
councils (as seen in Figure 1) as ‘state envoys’ or representatives of  the 
state government and the ruling party. Their assumption of  office does 
not involve the citizens and they are also the least autonomous type of  
local council vis-à-vis state governments. This type of  local council exists 
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in many states in Nigeria, and constitutes about two thirds of  all local 
governments. When states organise local council elections and the ruling 
party wins, these are Type 2 councils, which we can call ‘dual loyalists’ 
because they have both the ruling party and the local electorate to 
serve. Quite often, such councils emerge amidst widespread allegations 
of  electoral irregularities, which are made more credible by the fact 
that the ruling party is empowered by the constitution to constitute the 
electoral body and appoint the chair of  the electoral commission, so 
that elections can be manipulated to bring their chosen candidates into 
power. However, these are elected councils and have far more legitimacy 
and possibly also greater autonomy vis-à-vis state governments than 
nominated councils.
Type 3 councils – selected by the opposition – are possible theoretically 
but not in practice. It is usually only the ruling party that is able to 
select local councils. If  this does ever happen, it would be a token by the 
ruling party to pacify the opposition, or a strategy to bring it on board 
a coalition. On some occasions, the opposition party is able to wrest the 
control of  some local councils from the hold of  the party ruling at the 
state level. When this happens, it is often an expression of  the locals’ 
dissatisfaction with the performance of  the state government and an 
invitation to the opposition to prove that it can perform better. There 
have been very few local councils of  this Type 4 variety in Nigeria, and 
there are none at the current moment. Given how hard this has proven 
in the history of  democratic decentralisation in Nigeria, we can call 
this category of  local politicians ‘electoral heroes’ for managing to win 
against the state government. This type of  council, when it exists, may 
enjoy the greatest legitimacy and autonomy vis-à-vis state governments.
Each type of  democratic status has implications for the extent to which 
local councils can exercise autonomy in service delivery. However, given 
the distribution of  councils in Nigeria at the moment, we focus on just 
Types 1 and 2 – the state envoys and dual loyalists. Restated in the terms 
Figure 1 A typology of democratic statuses
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of  this typology, our hypothesis is that with regard to the performance 
in providing security services to citizens, dual loyalists would enjoy more 
positive perception by the electorate than state envoys. The rest of  this 
article checks on the extent to which this is true.
5 Methodology
Experimental designs come in handy when researchers try to determine 
if  and how a certain cause produces a certain outcome. These designs, 
which are necessarily comparative, allow the researcher to control the 
environment of  the research, randomly select their subjects and hold 
some factors constant while manipulating others to determine the effects 
of  these other factors on the outcome (Wimmer and Dominick 2011).
In many study settings, pure experiments are impracticable and evidence 
of  causation has to be based on quasi‑experimental designs. One of  the 
key differences between pure and quasi‑experiments is the inability of  the 
latter to randomly assign subjects to groups. In other words, researchers 
have to work with existing groups, not the ones they randomly created. This 
raises the question of  internal validity – a doubt as to the extent to which 
differences between the groups are solely the outcome of  the manipulation 
of  a variable or the presence or absence of  an intervention. Yet, carefully 
constructed quasi-experiments can produce valid causal claims.
With the intention of  studying if  and how the democratic status of  a 
local council influences the way citizens perceive its performance in 
providing public goods, specifically security services, we adopted the 
cross-case spatial comparative case study design. Paying attention to the 
nuances in the democratic status summed up earlier, we selected two 
diverse cases: a council appointed by the state governor, and one elected 
by citizens. We controlled for spatial, ethnic and socio‑demographic 
confounders by choosing contiguous local government councils located 
in neighbouring states. The two local government councils are Surulere 
in Oyo State (appointed council) and Asa in Kwara State (elected 
council). They are separated by the artificial boundary between Oyo 
and Kwara states. Both local councils have Yoruba‑speaking populations 
that are mostly rural subsistence farmers and traders. Both local 
government areas also experience the same kind of  insecurity problems 
– mostly property theft and clashes between farmers and herdsmen. In 
both of  them, there are formal crime prevention agencies (the police, 
the SSS, and the NSCDC) and informal actors, such as vigilantes, 
hunter-volunteers and other forms of  community-driven crime 
prevention arrangements.
With reference to factors that might affect security provisioning, such 
as population size and population mix, neighbourhood density, level of  
urbanisation or industrialisation, presence of  state security agencies, 
and level of  unemployment, among others (Ojebode et al. 2016), the 
two local government areas are identical. According to the 2006 census, 
Asa has a population of  126,432 (Kwara State Government 2015) 
while Surulere has 126,692 (Oyo State Government 2015). Both have 
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population densities below the national average: 90.3 per sq km for Asa 
and 129 per sq km for Surulere against the national average of  200 per 
sq km. Furthermore, both Kwara and Oyo states are ruled by the same 
political party, the All Progressive Congress (APC). The main observable 
difference between the two local government areas is that for one the 
executive council was elected, while in the other it was appointed.
We began with the collection and analysis of  quantitative survey data, 
a stage designed to show citizens’ perception of  the performance of  
their local councils in the provision of  security services. The outcome 
of  that analysis called for, and thus guided, further in-depth qualitative 
investigation in a second round of  data collection. This second round 
focused on understanding why the local councils were perceived as they 
were by the citizens, and helped us unravel the unexpected manner 
in which democratic status influenced citizens’ perception of  security 
provisioning by leading us to map a causal pathway between status and 
security provisioning. The integration of  both findings led us to a third 
and final round of  data collection, which was also qualitative and was 
meant for the purpose of  validation through in‑depth interviews with 
community leaders and security officials, and through field observations.
This sequencing and combination of  methods was advantageous. As we 
show later, the analysis of  the first wave of  quantitative data collection 
largely nullified the hypothesis that the elected council would be better 
perceived by its citizens than appointed councils. The second wave of  
data collection focused on why this was so, as it tried to establish the 
link between democratic status and citizens’ perception, while the third 
wave helped in further clarifying this and validating our claims as we 
discussed our findings with community leaders and security officials.
Although our case and unit of  analysis is the local government area 
and our design is, therefore, a small-N design, our data come from 
an aggregation of  the views of  randomly selected individuals. We 
selected 235 respondents to the questionnaire using a combination of  
systematic and convenience sampling techniques. Focusing mainly on the 
headquarters of  the local government areas – Iresadu town in Surulere 
council, and Afon town in Asa council – we selected the first willing adult 
respondent each from every fifth house with a random start. This gave 
us 139 males and 96 females; 121 respondents from the Surulere Local 
Government Area and 114 from the Asa Local Government Area.
As part of  the qualitative data collection, we conducted 16 interviews 
with local government officials, traditional community leaders, members 
of  the Police–Community Relations Committee (PCRC), two officers of  
the NSCDC, and some community members and leaders. We included 
security personnel because we wanted an insight into the structure of  
security services rendered or supported by the local council, especially to 
be sure these were similar in the two councils; we included community 
members and leaders to gain additional insight into community 
perception of  the local council.
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6 Similar structure, similar experiences of (in)security
We found a tripartite structure of  security provisioning in each 
council that comprised government services; community-led and 
community-driven security services; and private and commercial 
services. The relationship among these is somewhat nondescript and 
required our attention.
The first set of  security services are provided by the government and 
involve the police, the SSS, the NSCDC and the local government 
officials. These agencies are independent of  one another: the police, 
SSS and the NSCDC take orders from their state headquarters 
located in the state capitals, while the local government officials take 
orders from the local government chairperson. Together, they form 
a committee that meets once every month to deliberate on security 
issues and sometimes to plan joint actions. The committee also includes 
community leaders. There are no guidelines or standard operating 
procedures guiding the collaboration between these parties, and the 
chairperson does not have power of  veto. He is more of  a coordinator 
than a chairperson. The main funding for security agencies comes from 
the federal government through the commanding offices in the state 
capitals. However, local government councils support the police, SSS 
and NSCDC materially by donating vehicles (including motorcycles), 
and sometimes also maintaining these vehicles.
Disagreements sometimes occur among them, as happened during 
the last general elections when a chairperson deployed certain 
anti‑opposition tactics which were interpreted by the security agencies 
as being too political and which ‘our commanding officers (in the state 
capital) did not sanction’.4 Such disagreements sometimes fester to the 
point that the committee members have to assert their independence 
and their loyalty to their commanding officers in the state capitals, over 
the wishes of  the council chairperson.
The second set of  community-driven security services are mainly 
the activities of  neighbourhood or village‑based associations led 
by a community leader, or baálé. These associations or network of  
associations hire watchmen who work mainly nights and pay them from 
contributions by members. They may hire members of  a registered 
and recognised national association, the Vigilante Group of  Nigeria. 
Some communities hire members of  hunters’ associations – those 
who professionally hunt for game, mostly in rural areas – that provide 
protection to the community for a fee. In many cases, vigilante members 
simply volunteer ‘without receiving a dime’ from the local government.5 
However, there were indications that the two local councils not only 
involve community leaders in the security committee but also support 
hunters and vigilante groups financially and in kind. They do this using 
different formats, to which we will return shortly.
The third set of  services comprise private and commercial security 
arrangements by banks and a few rich people who can afford these. 
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This category is independent of  the government and community‑based 
security services, and are therefore not included in this analysis.
The three types of  security arrangements – government, community-
based and private security – are unevenly distributed across the local 
government areas. Whereas all three are clearly visible in the local 
government headquarters, the presence of  government and private 
services wanes as one moves from the headquarters to the interior, more 
rural parts of  the jurisdiction, where community‑driven services become 
more prominent. This has a key implication for our understanding of  
decentralisation. Rather than being a process that brings government 
and administrative decisions closer to the grass roots, decentralisation 
has become the process of  multiplying little centres or nuclei rather than 
of  scattering the centre and moving government closer to the citizens. As 
noted by Kauzya (2007), ‘if  decentralization has to be successful it needs 
to be conceived as the transfer of  power and authority to the people and 
not only to local governments’. Local government headquarters have 
become little state capitals where facilities and government presence are 
concentrated, and they present a sharp contrast to the rest of  the local 
government areas that lie just a few kilometres away.
The similarities between the two local governments go beyond the 
structure of  security services that exists. There are also similarities in 
citizens’ experience of  crime. A Chi-square test6 for independence (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) was conducted to test whether citizens in 
Surulere, the appointed local government council, experienced more 
crime than those in Asa, an elected local government council. We asked 
citizens about whether or not they have experienced a serious crime. 
The results in Table 1 indicated no significant association between status 
of  local government and experience of  crime. To be significant, the 
p‑value needs to be .05 or smaller. In this case the value of  .466 is larger 
than the value of  .05, so we concluded that our result is not significant. 
The effect size (phi = –.058) is also considered a very small effect using 
Cohen’s (1988) criteria of  .10 for a small effect, .30 for a medium effect 
and .50 for a large effect.
Table 1 Results of 2 by 2 Chi-square test for status of Local Government Area (LGA) 
and experience of crime
Status of LGA No Yes df x2 p-value phi
Appointed 93 
(76.9%)
28 
(23.1%) 
1 .532 .466 -.058
Elected 93 
(81.6%)
21 
(18.4%)
Total 186 
(79.1%)
49 
(20.9%)
235 (100%)
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
42 | Ojebode et al. Is Election a Disadvantage? Nigerian Local Councils and Security Provision
Vol. 48 No. 2 March 2017: ‘Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa’
In addition to comparing the local councils on the frequency of  crime 
experienced by citizens, we also compared them on the type of  crime 
experienced. This is important because types of  crime experienced 
can also influence perception of  safety and how citizens judge the 
performance of  government. Here too we found no significant 
differences across the two local government areas. As Table 2 shows, 
a 2 by 7 Chi‑square test for independence shows that there was 
no significant association between the democratic status of  local 
government and types of  crime experienced by its citizens. The effect 
size (Cramer’s V = .202) is also considered a very small effect.
The two local government areas are similar in terms of  the structure of  
security service provision at the local level, and citizens’ experience of  
crime. This adds to the earlier similarities we pointed out in terms of  
culture, demographics and economics across the two local government 
areas to show that they are largely similar units. And yet, the perception 
of  their citizens of  the performances of  their local government councils 
is not the same, despite the fact that the council that is perceived 
negatively has actually initiated security projects, while the council 
perceived positively has not. We look at and explain this curious finding 
in the next section.
7 Different levels of satisfaction with local government
We asked respondents to state their level of  satisfaction with the security 
services provided by their local governments. Table 3 shows the result. 
An independent-samples t-test7 was conducted to compare the level 
of  satisfaction with security services of  those whose local government 
leaders were appointed and those whose leaders were elected. The 
p‑value results show that there was a statistically significant difference 
(p<0.05) in satisfaction here – those whose local government leaders 
were appointed were more satisfied with security services than those 
whose local government leaders were elected. The magnitude of  
the difference in the means is ‑0.62, and about 10 per cent of  the 
Table 2 Results of 2 by 7 Chi-square test for status of Local Government Area (LGA) and types of crime experienced
Status of 
LGA
df x2 p-value Cramer’s 
V
Unarmed 
robbery 
without 
aggression 
or physical 
threat
Unarmed 
robbery 
with 
assault or 
physical 
threats
Armed 
robbery
Household 
theft
Others Property 
damage
None 6 9.603 .142 .202
Appointed 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.5%) 5 (4.5%) 17 (14.0%) 2 (1.7%) 3 (2.5%) 90 (74.4%)
Elected 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 10 (8.8%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (7.0%) 93 (81.6%)
Total 2 (0.9%) 4 (1.7%) 6 (2.6%) 27 (11.5%) 2 (0.9%) 11 (4.7%) 183 (77.9%) 235 
(100%)
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
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variance in satisfaction with security services is explained by the groups 
(appointed and elected).
The contrast in the perceived performance of  both councils is starker 
in the interview data. Interviewees in Asa Local Government Area (the 
elected council) could hardly find a kind word to describe the security 
services of  their local government council. Recurrent references were 
made to the recruitment of  the vigilantes and the local government’s 
inability to pay them. Some claimed that even when the vigilantes were 
being paid, they were deployed to guard government property not 
citizens. An interviewee8 in Asa (elected) Local Government Area stated 
why the local government was unresponsive:
The local government authority has done nothing to ease the pains of  the 
security threats… They have not performed to the expectations in other aspects 
too. In my opinion, they have good intentions but are being thwarted by financial 
constraints. Joint Account with the state government has made progress at 
local government impossible.9 I am an insider myself. The local government is 
paralysed; they can’t even pay the salary of  their workers.
On the other hand, interviewees in Surulere Local Government Area 
(an appointed council) were satisfied with the performance of  the local 
government council in terms of  security provision. An interviewee10 in 
Surulere Local Government Area (appointed) said:
The Local Government Authority has been a tremendous supporter of  the 
Security Agents. They assist with money and other necessary gadgets. The police 
and vigilantes have benefited from this good gesture. They are doing very well.
In spite of  the shared common experiences of  insecurity types and 
levels across the two local government areas, citizens of  Asa, the elected 
council, remained deeply disaffected while citizens of  Surulere, the 
appointed council, remained satisfied with their council’s performance. 
The difference in the level of  satisfaction could not have been a 
product of  experience of  crime or a result of  any cultural, economic 
or demographic differences, since these were held constant. As the 
next section shows, it is rather a product of  the style of  security service 
provision of  the local government councils, which is itself  traceable to 
their democratic status.
Table 3 Local government democratic status and citizens’ satisfaction with local 
government’s security services
Group N M SD t p-value Eta  
squared
Appointed 114 9.75 2.12
Elected 121 9.13 1.82 -2.37 0.05 .100
Source Authors’ fieldwork.
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8 How democratic status matters
Why would the citizens in a local government area perceive the 
security services of  its local council poorly while another next to it 
perceives those of  its local council in much better light when these two 
groups of  citizens have similar experiences of  insecurity and similar 
security provision structure, among other germane similarities? Our 
analysis shows that the reason for this disparity in perception was not 
the security situation or the performance of  the local government 
authorities but rather in the approaches adopted by each council in 
providing security. We discovered that these approaches are a reflection 
of  the democratic statuses of  these local government authorities. The 
two different approaches are presented graphically in Figure 2.
Both local governments adopted a formal approach to working with 
formal agencies such as the police, SSS and the NSCDC. There are 
regular monthly meetings, with minutes of  meetings and other formal 
procedures. However, they have markedly different approaches to 
working with informal security providers, which constitute a significant 
part of  security provision in both areas. Asa Local Government 
Council, an elected council, adopted a formal approach in providing 
security services with the traditional informal security service providers 
– the community leaders and associations, vigilante groups and local 
hunters – by starting a major project with these groups. They were 
recruited, trained, kitted out and put on a monthly salary of  N7,000 
(less than US$20). However, the local government could not sustain this 
and the arrangement failed, creating a feeling of  disaffection on the 
part of  the citizens. On the other hand, Surulere Local Government 
Council, an appointed council, adopted an informal approach to 
working with informal partners. By implication, the appointed council 
did not have a commitment to regularly support or sponsor the informal 
agents. If  there were funds, the council supported the agents, if  funds 
were unavailable, the council did not support them. Why did the two 
local governments adopt such different approaches?
8.1 Asa
We probed further to understand why the elected council in Asa 
would embark on the formalisation of  an informal but widespread 
Figure 2 Approaches adopted by elected and appointed local governments with formal and informal agencies
Source Authors’ own.
Asa (elected)
Formal partners:  
police, SSS, NSCDC
Informal partners:  
communities, hunters, 
vigilantes
Surulere (appointed)
Formal approach
Formal approach
Formal approach
Informal approach
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and reportedly effective security arrangement (Ojebode et al. 2016). 
Recruiting and kitting up local vigilante members and hunters, it seems, 
has apparent strategic and intrinsic value for security provisioning. Being 
locals, they have a thorough knowledge of  the geography of  the area and 
can therefore monitor movements and follow trails. Not only this, they 
know the residents in the communities and have a better idea of  likely 
offenders than the police would have, and they are also known by the 
community, and so are most likely to abstain from conduct unbecoming 
of  a community member – such as extortion or victimisation. Selecting 
them and training them was thus strategic. Closely related to this is the 
fact that recruiting and kitting out locals was also a way of  providing 
employment and reducing the incidence of  crime.
There are extrinsic values of  this strategy as well. The council 
strategically chose a method that would have the greatest impact on 
the psyche of  the locals: official uniform, training (including drills and 
march‑pasts) and kits. In a seminar paper presented on the non‑verbal 
significance of  official uniforms, Deinde (2013) explained that the 
official uniform in colonial and postcolonial Africa was more than 
mere clothing or, as it is in the West, an expression of  state presence. It 
was also an expression of  the wearer’s worth and importance. To kit a 
person out was, therefore, to give them legitimate state presence as well 
as enhance her or his worth in the community. This, according to him, 
explained the awe with which colonial police officers were treated and 
the widespread cases of  corruption against them even at that time.
At the beginning, our interviewees observed, the programme attracted 
the attention and commendation of  communities for its ingenuity and 
its immediate impact, not just on security, but also on employment.
Everybody was happy. Hunters and many of  these other jobless people were 
bringing something home at the end of  every month. They had uniform and salary. 
Like soldiers. And their families were happy too and they were proud. And people 
said this chairman had good ideas and he was like a saviour. We said he made 
(electoral) promises and we voted for him, and now he is fulfilling them.11
However, the chairperson could not sustain the programme beyond 
the first 18 months. A community leader who also worked in the 
local government informed us that funds coming in from the federal 
government through the state reduced, and internally-generated 
revenue did not increase. Soon, the chairperson stopped paying the 
recruited and kitted-out locals.
When our salaries stopped coming, (there was) nothing to show at home at the 
end of  the month. What is uniform? What is boots? Is that food? People even 
made jest of  us; uniform without salary.12
The economic and social aspects of  this funding discontinuation was 
negatively felt by both the affected workers, their dependants and others 
in the local government area. The eventual outcome was palpable 
disaffection against the local government authority.
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A simple depiction as the one in Figure 3 risks over-simplifying a 
complex situation, yet it is invaluable in laying out the basic skeleton of  
a complex problem. Figure 3 summarises the likely reasons the elected 
council may be perceived negatively by the electorate, in this case with 
reference to their performance in providing security services.
An elected local government chairperson is a dual loyalist: he has the 
electorate to serve but also has party stalwarts to please. Figure 3 shows 
that the dual loyalist faces pressure from two separate directions. At 
the top of  the list of  these loyalists are those influential people, called 
‘godfathers’, who dictate the distribution of  party tickets to contest 
elections and can influence votes and victory. Edigin (2010) points out 
that large resources are expended to please and service these godfathers 
or ‘kingmakers’. Those who refuse to serve the godfathers after their 
electoral victory are ‘subjected to indecent manipulations’ and risk 
being impeached (Albert 2005: 105). Edigin (2010) cites examples 
of  such impeachments, which godfathers can affect either through 
legislative means, which they also control in many cases, or through 
more informal means, such as gangs that are used to create violence 
and other forms of  crisis in the jurisdiction of  their estranged ‘godsons’ 
(Ellis 2008; Olarinmoye 2008). We do not have firm evidence of  how 
many resources went into pleasing the godfathers in our two cases, 
but most analyses suggest that Nigerian politicians expend substantial 
financial resources to service godfathers. In fact, Albert (2005: 103) 
explains that while there are powerful people all over the world who 
are capable of  influencing electoral victory, the Nigerian political 
godfather is unique in that he has ‘turned politics into a money-making 
business… an economic investment that must yield superlative dividends 
by all means’.
Election, 
promises and 
victory
Pressure to 
‘perform’
Creation of 
big projects 
(Vigilante, etc.)
Projects 
abandoned
Disaffection, 
poor rating
Expectations 
from electorate
Funds to ‘settle’ 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Poor funding 
from state
Pressure from 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Figure 3 Causal pathway from elected democratic status to poor perception of performance
Source Authors’ own.
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The second source of  pressure comes from the electorate and their 
expectations of  effective delivery, based on promises made during 
election speeches, rallies and campaigns. To meet these, the elected 
council chairperson creates big projects, in this case security projects. 
However, as funds eventually reduce but demands from godfathers 
and party bosses do not, projects are abandoned. People lose jobs 
and the community at large witnesses other obvious signs of  the local 
government moving away from projects and electoral promises, and 
as disaffection sets in, the chairperson is seen as yet another deceitful 
politician by citizens.
8.2 Surulere
Why would a state envoy, that is, the appointed local council 
chairperson, neither adopt a formal approach to security nor initiate 
a new security project? The chairperson of  Surulere local government 
council did not initiate a project; he depended on instructions from 
the state government for every project. He had no independence and 
could not recruit workers for a project except with the approval of  the 
state governor. Since he did not campaign for elections, he did not 
make promises and therefore, there is little or no expectation from the 
electorate. Given the ubiquity of  godfather‑ism in Nigerian politics, 
as discussed previously, we suggest that he is faced with pressures from 
godfathers as well, but that is the only set of  pressures he faces since 
there is no electorate in this situation.
Our interviewees from Surulere expressed satisfaction with the performance 
of  the local government in security provision. A leader of  the local 
watchmen (hunters) whom we interviewed13 claimed that the chairperson:
supports us very well. He donated motorcycles to us and also gives us money 
from time to time… not every month. We don’t get money every month since we 
Figure 4 Causal pathway from appointed democratic status to good perception of performance
Source Authors’ own.
No election; 
no promises
Instruction from 
governor
Support existing informal 
security arrangements 
without commitment
Favourable 
perception
Funds to ‘settle’ 
godfathers, 
party, etc.
Poor funding 
from state
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are not civil servants. Sometimes the money is much; sometimes the money is 
small. We all know that things are hard in this country.
It is important to note that the motorcycles were regarded as donations 
rather than entitlements. Donations evoke a sense of  gratitude; 
entitlements do not.
Another interviewee commended the chairperson of  Surulere for 
occasionally attending their meetings or sending his representatives. This 
was a sign that the chairperson recognised and respected them. Others 
spoke of  his ‘closeness’ to the traditional rulers which is interpreted as a 
sign of  his humility and respect for tradition and culture: ‘He does not 
pass on this main road without stopping to greet our leader’. That these 
simple and generally common gestures are commended shows that the 
citizens did not expect these from the appointed chairperson who, in 
their view, is not under any obligation to make such gestures.
Occasionally, when specific needs arise, the leaders of  the informal 
security agents approach the local government chairperson in Surulere 
for financial assistance. One such instance was when the vigilante group 
wanted to buy uniforms. The chairperson donated some money for this. 
At another time, he donated money for repairing their motorcycles. 
At other times, he simply invited them and gave them some money for 
their operations and logistics, such as when the state governor visits the 
local area and all informal agents are mobilised and put on high alert. 
The spontaneity of  such acts, and the fact that they were unexpected, 
left the informal agents deeply impressed.
From the perspectives of  the citizens of  Asa and Surulere, one 
chairperson represented unmet expectations and unfulfilled promises, 
while the other represented unexpected gestures. The former was 
thus regarded with disaffection while the latter was positively rated. 
It seems that democratic status and its attendant politics matters in 
citizens’ perception of  the performance of  local councils, and that the 
pathway works through two particular factors – whether citizens have 
expectations of  delivery from their local governments, and whether 
there are enough resources available to elected leaders to meet the 
various pressures that they must operate under.
9 Conclusion: is being elected a disadvantage?
The evidence presented in this article shows that local elections in a context 
of  party control, godfather‑ism, and a lack of  financial resources and 
autonomy sets elected local councils up for failure, and disaffection from 
their constituents. Elections lead to a sense of  entitlement by citizens, a 
particular strength of  democracy, but this needs to be accompanied by 
an ability to deliver on electoral promises and on the particular expressed 
needs of  the electorate. When promises are not met by delivery, disaffection 
results. Where no promises are made, any delivery or gesture by leaders 
is unexpected, and therefore, considered generous. In either case, the 
imperatives of  democracy and the needs of  citizens are not well served.
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As opposed to Lindberg’s (2006) findings on the significance of  
African elections and on democratic ‘lock‑ins’, our findings suggest 
that local government elections that operate under political and 
financial constraints may actually create a constituency against further 
democratic decentralisation. If  community members perceive the 
performance of  those democratically entrusted with leadership positions 
as being worse than those appointed to these positions by party bosses, 
then it is possible that support for elected local governments may reduce 
over time. Making democratic decentralisation work requires a legal and 
constitutional framework that protects elected council chairpersons from 
the stranglehold of  political ‘godfathers’, and provides them with some 
measure of  fiscal independence and autonomy vis-à-vis state governors 
to provide services.
Notes
* Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Partnership for African 
Social and Governance Research (PASGR) for a grant for this 
research, and to two anonymous reviewers and Shandana Khan 
Mohmand at the Institute of  Development Studies for detailed 
comments on our article.
1 An appointed local council is made up of  a caretaker committee 
headed by the chairperson: all the members of  this committee and 
the chairperson are appointed by the state governor. An elected 
council is headed by an executive chairperson who chooses his/her 
own cabinet.
2 Like most African borders, these borders are not coterminous with 
language, ethnicity or cultural boundaries. They are arbitrary.
3 About four months after our data collection, the Kwara State 
governor dissolved the elected council of  Asa Local Government, 
thereby turning the local government into an appointed one.
4 Interview with official of  a security agency, May 2016.
5 Interview with member of  Vigilante group, June 2016.
6 We used the Chi‑square test to analyse categorical outcome variables.
7 We used the t‑test to analyse continuous outcome variables.
8 July 2016.
9 State governments created what they called Joint Accounts to which 
all funds sent by the federal government for local governments are 
deposited. This account is controlled by the governor who decides 
which local government gets what and for what purpose.
10 July 2016.
11 June 2016.
12 July 2016.
13 July 2016.
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